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A8stract9 
Based on an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy we argue that a monetary 
system is more stable than one would expect from individual rationality. We show that 
positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system, provided every participant considers the 
feedbacks of his choice to the stationary equilibrium. If however the participants do not play 
stationary strategies and some participants notoriously refuse to accept money then due to 
negative reciprocity their behavior will eventually induce a break down of the monetary 
system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the fundamental problems in economics is to understand under which conditions 
money has positive value in equilibrium. Since monetary equilibria are usually Pareto 
superior to non-monetary equilibria, economic policy makers need to understand which shifts 
in the exogenous conditions of the economy may lead to a break down of the monetary 
system, i.e. may lead an economy from its monetary equilibrium to a non-monetary 
equilibrium. 
 
To solve this problem, economic theorists looked into game theoretic foundations of money. 
Starting from the seminal papers of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991, 1993) an impressive 
literature was developed in which markets are no longer considered to be well organized but 
traders meet randomly in pairs, see also Boldrin, Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), Trejos and 
Wright (1993) and Wright (1995).  This literature has shown that under certain conditions, in 
a decentralized economy, a positive value of money can be sustained as a Nash-equilibrium. 
In particular in this equilibrium no monetary authority is needed to back money. The stability 
of the monetary system is solely based on the assumption of common knowledge of 
individual rationality. It is based on the belief that the other trading partners accept money 
which itself makes accepting money the best choice of every participant. The participants 
switch to the non-monetary Nash-equilibrium, for example if the exogenous uncertainty about 
finding a future trading partner is too high to sustain accepting money as the best response to 
itself. This uncertainty can be modeled as a break-off probability, which determines whether 
the game is continued to the next round. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to argue that individual rationality – understood as maximization 
of an objective function that depends on the actions of the other players but that ignores the 
*+%"..( of the other players – is not sufficient to understand the stability of a monetary 
system. As has been argued elsewhere (see for example Rabin (1993), Fehr and Gächter 
(1998), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2000), Cox (2002)), individual 
behavior is often motivated by /$3'*/"3'1%. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels 
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(2000), and Falk and Fischbacher (1999)) for example, have shown that taking also into 
account the effect of inequity aversion, will give a much better model to predict individual 
behavior. Many experimental findings support this result (for a review see Fehr and Schmidt 
(2001)). Other authors use different preferences or intentions. In this paper we argue that due 
to *"('1';$& /$3'*/"3'1%& a monetary system is more stable than individual rationality would 
suggest, provided every participant takes the feedback of his choice on the stationary 
equilibrium into account. That is to say, even if for the given break off probability individual 
rationality would imply not to accept money reciprocal behavior will still lead to a monetary 
equilibrium. If however some participants notoriously refuse to accept money then due to 
#$2+1';$& /$3'*/"3'1% their behavior will eventually induce a break down of the monetary 
system if agents react to the absolute number of having been disappointed. 
 
In our context we consider indirect reciprocity, since the partners with whom goods and 
money are exchanged change from one period to another. An agent cannot expect to get a 
positive feedback from an agent who benefited from her actions since these agents might not 
meet again. Indirect reciprocity has been analyzed in the helping game (Seinen and Schramm 
(2001), Engelmann and Fischbacher (2002)). Engelmann and Fischbacher (2002) observed 
indirect reciprocity in a design that controls for considerations like reputation building or 
other strategic considerations. There are some differences between the helping game and our 
model of a monetary system. For example, in the monetary system discounting is modeled, 
the strategy of not trading (or helping) is an equilibrium strategy, and using this strategy leads 
to Pareto-optimal outcomes.  
 
<4$&5")$-&".&"6/&*+*$/&'(&+-("&3"5*+/+,-$&7'14&+&(1/+#2$/(&)$('2#&'#&*6,-'3&2"")&2+5$(&'#&
74'34&14$&"**"#$#1(&7'14&74"5&14$&2+5$&'(&*-+%$)&34+#2$&$;$/%&*$/'"):&="/&*6,-'3&2"")&
2+5$(&14$&)'..$/$#3$&,$17$$#&*+/1#$/(&>+-7+%(&*-+%'#2&7'14&14$&(+5$&*-+%$/?&+#)&14$&
(1/+#2$/(&)$('2#&4+;$&,$$#&+#+-%@$)&$0*$/'5$#1+--%&>A$($/&+#)&;+#&B'#)$#&>C000??:&E#&14$&
(1/+#2$/(&)$('2#&/$3'*/"3+-&,$4+;'"/&'(&-$((&./$F6$#1-%&",($/;$)&+(&'#&14$&*+/1#$/(&)$('2#G&,61&
'1&'(&*/$($#1&+#)&4+(&+&(1/"#2&'5*+31:&
 
Since the point of our paper is to get some first insights into the effects of reciprocity on the 
stability of monetary systems, we will not start from the most advanced micro-money model 
developed so far. See Lagos and Wright (2002) for the most recent model of this type. We 
rather begin by looking at the most elementary monetary economy in which one indivisible 
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unit of a service can be bought and sold (in an infinite horizon economy with random 
matching) against one indivisible unit of money. To be more specific, in every period there 
are two groups of agents. Those endowed with one unit of money and those without any 
money. Money holders try to buy a service from non-money holders. The latter can decide 
whether to accept money for the service or whether to reject it. If they accept money then they 
loose some utility from providing the service but they become money holders in the next 
period. On the other hand, money holders try to give away their money in order to benefit 
from the service.  
 
There can be two stationary equilibria in this elementary monetary economy: Non-monetary 
equilibria in which nobody accepts money and monetary equilibria in which ("5$ participants 
accept money. Our reasoning is based on how the occurrence of monetary equilibria depends 
on discounting. Discounting is enforced by a chance move that determines whether the game 
is ended in this period or whether it is continued. To get some insight of actual behavior in 
such an elementary monetary economy we run a series of experiments in which a market is 
set up with this structure. As a point of reference we also run individual decision experiments 
in which the probability that money is accepted is given exogenously. In the experiments it 
turns out that agents tend to accept money in the market experiment even for those discount 
factors for which they have rejected money in the individual decision situation. Whereas 
neither strategic behavior nor social conventions can explain this fact it can be derived from 
indirect reciprocity. Agents tend to accept money if they themselves have previously 
benefited from someone accepting money. It is important to note that in this case money is 
accepted even though the expected utility, ignoring the payoffs of others, is decreased, i.e. 
even though standard rationality would be violated!  Moreover, the experiments show that 
agents tend to reject money if the absolute number of rejections they have faced so far 
exceeds some trigger value. Note that standard rationality would highlight the importance of 
the /$-+1';$ frequency of rejections faced so far.  We explain this finding by negative 
reciprocity. 
 
The Kiyotaki-Wright model has been experimentally tested by Duffy and Ochs (1999). 
Overall it turned out that the market predictions work well. In this paper we will focus on the 
individual behavior and how interaction in a market changes individual behavior. As often 
observed market behavior might be as predicted by theory whereas individual behavior is 
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different. For this reason we have chosen a simpler setting and two treatments: one on 
individual behavior and one on market behavior from which we want to draw our conclusions.  
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the first part we present a model in the form of 
a game that represents the considered situation. We also formulate an individual decision 
problem to compare the effects of the individual decisions with the effects in a market. In the 
theoretical part we define and characterize stationary equilibria. In the last part we test the 
theoretical results in an experiment. We proceed by giving the theoretical results without 
considering reciprocity as a benchmark and test these predictions. In the experiments it turns 
out that agents never re-enter the game, i.e. once they have chosen to stay idle they will 
remain so till the end of the game. Then we present a model incorporating reciprocity. This 
model allows us to define stationary equilibria including the effect of reciprocity which we 
use to explain two additional experimental findings. Agents tend to accept money in the 
market experiment even for those discount factors for which they have rejected money in the 
individual decision situation and agents tend to reject money if the +,("-61$ number of 
rejections they have faced so far exceeds some trigger value.  
 
2. /he !odel 
 
We analyze an individual decision making problem (Game I) and a market (Game II). Game 
II is the game representing the situation described in the introduction. Game I results from 
Game II by “reducing” Game II to an individual decision making problem. For the theoretical 
and experimental analysis it is instructive to compare the results of Game II with the results of 
Game I.  
/he individual decision making situation9 Came I 
Time, t=1,2, …, is discrete and infinite. In every period the decision maker selects her action 
out of the two possible actions {a,n}. The action “a”(ccept) is interpreted as: provide a service 
and accept one unit of money for the service. The action “n”(ot) is interpreted as not accepting 
money and not providing the service. Let c and g be positive constants and let ui() be the per 
period utility function of player i=1,…,N.  ui(-c) is the utility cost of providing the service and 
ui(g) is the utility gain from obtaining the service. If the decision maker i chooses action “a” 
she receives one unit of money and her payoff in this period is ui(-c). In the next period she is 
then endowed with one unit of money which she uses in order to get the benefit ui(g). If she 
chooses “n” she does not receive one unit of money and her payoff is 0 and the game ends. 
Note that money does not provide any utility itself. It is a means to obtaining ui(g). 
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We assume an inter-temporal  utility function that is time additive, i.e: 
t
i iU (x) ! u (x ), with 0 < ! < 1 a discounting rate.tt 1
!
" #
"
 As we will see later, the observed strategies 
seem to be consistent with this assumption for the majority of participants (see the results of 
game I). 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the situation. A player can be in two states, A or B, or she can end the 
game. If she is in state A she makes her choice “a” or “n”. If she chooses “n” the game ends. 
If she chooses “a” she changes to state B. At the beginning of the next period she receives the 
benefit ui(g) for one unit of money and she automatically changes from state B to state A.  
 
Provided the player has not chosen to end the game, after every period a chance move 
determines whether the game is continued or ended. The probability of continuing is ! (0 " ! 
" 1). The chance move models the discounting. Note that alternatively we could have 
associated the choice “n” with staying in the state A. However, since instantaneous payoffs 
and the continuation probability are stationary, there is no reason to re-enter the game. In the 
market game, Game II, we have allowed for re-entering but it never occurred. Moreover, 
introducing “n” as a second choice when in state B would be weakly dominated because of 
discounting. 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic presentation of the transitions between the groups A and B  
     depending on the choices in the individual optimization problem (Game I). 
 
A 
 B 
!!"#$%
$"
&'!"
 7
 
 
/he !arket9 Came II 
 
 
We consider the following game. Time is discrete and infinite: t=1,2, … . The set of players is 
I={1,2,..,N} with N even. 
 
At the beginning of the first period half of the players are endowed with one unit of money. 
These players are said to be in group B. The other half of the players does not have money. 
They are said to be in group A. Initially groups are randomly selected. Every period every 
player in group A can provide a service which can be offered to group B-players at a price of 
one unit of money.  Every period consists of four stages. 
 
In the first stage the players select their actions. The players who are in group A can select 
between two actions {a,n} as in Game I. The action “a”(ccept) is interpreted as: provide a 
service and accept one unit of money for the service. The action “n”(ot) is interpreted as not 
accepting money and not providing the service. The players in group B play “p”(ay) which is 
interpreted as pay one unit of money and benefit from the service (provided one is matched 
with some player playing “a”). As in Game I, introducing “n” as a second choice for group B-
players would be weakly dominated because of discounting.  
 
In the second stage every player of group A is randomly matched with one player of group B. 
The players are not informed about the name of their partner.  
 
In the third stage the payoffs in this period are determined. ui(-c) is the cost of providing the 
service and ui(g) is the gain of player i from obtaining the service. The per period payoff of 
the matched pair of players i (in group A) and j (in group B) depends on the chosen actions as 
given in table 1. 
 
i/j “p”(ay) 
“a“(ccept) ui(-c), uj(g) 
“n“(ot) accept ui(0), uj(0) 
 
Table 1: Payoff of a matched pair of players. 
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If player j receives a payoff uj(g) she changes from group B to A. Correspondingly, player i 
with whom she is matched gets the payoff ui(-c) and changes from group A to B. The 
interpretation is that player j obtains the service and pays one unit of money to player i who 
provides the service. If no money is accepted both players get a payoff of 0 and do not change 
groups.  This is illustrated in Figure 2. In this figure the variable µ denotes the probability 
with which a player in group B will get his money accepted. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Schematic presentation of the transitions between the groups A and B  
      depending on the choices in the market (Game II). 
 
 
In stage four a chance move determines whether the game is continued or ended. The 
probability of continuing is ! (0"!"1). This chance move is interpreted as discounting. 
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EEuili8rium Concepts 
 
What are optimal policies for playing the Games I and II? As we have argued above, in Game 
I it is reasonable to assume that players do not re-enter the game. The question then is whether 
playing the game for some time is a reasonable strategy. Assuming discounted expected 
utility the answer is clearly negative because there are no state variables other than being in A 
or B. Note that, for example, the wealth level accumulated along the play of the game is no 
state variable because we have assumed expected discounted utility. Hence the optimal 
solution of Game I is time independent: depending on the exogenous parameters you either 
play the game or you do not play it. It can be computed from the Bellman equations of this 
game.  
 
In Game II as a first idea one could also compute the stationary equilibrium from the 
corresponding Bellman equations. This implies that agents do only care about the current state 
A or B and do not care about the history of play of the game, for example. This is justified 
again by the assumption of expected discounted utility. Hence as in Game I also in Game II 
the solution of the game can be computed using Bellman equations with only A and B being 
the state variables. The same methodology is used for the case of indirect reciprocity, which is 
our Finding 1.  
 
To simplify the computations we normalize the instantaneous utility of every agent i to be 0 if 
he gets the payoff 0. Moreover, as Lemma 1 in Appendix B shows it is sufficient to only 
compute the conditions for choosing “n” because the reverse condition will then lead the 
player to choose “a”. 
 
The stationary solution of Game I 
 
The expected total continuation payoff Vi(A) of the decision maker from the point of view of 
state A  is: 
$% i i i,( ) max 0,  u (-c)  [u (g)  V (A)]' # +I J &" ' ' . 
 
Where the first (second) argument in the maximum operator is obtained for the choice n (a). 
Suppose the first argument is not smaller than the second, then playing “n” is optimal and 
( ) 0'I J " . 
 10
 
The condition for this to hold is:  
 
0 ( ) ( ( ) 0)' '6 3 6 2&( ) ' ' i
i
-u (-c) 
u (g)
&* +   
 
Hence we obtain the cut off value: 
___
i
i
-u (-c)(1)    min 1,max 0,
u (g)
E
&
, -. /0 0" 1 23 4
0 05 67 8
    
An interpretation of this criterion is that the decision maker selects “a” if the expected payoff 
of paying ui(-c) in one period and obtaining the payoff ui(g) with probability ! in the next 
period is higher than or equal to the payoff 0 for action “n”. Otherwise she will select action 
“n”. For a given decision problem with fixed ! according to this solution a decision maker 
will in every period select either “n” or either “a” depending on the inequality above.  Every 
player can be described by a cut-off value i!
E
for which she is indifferent between the two 
actions. If ß > i!
E
 she chooses action “a” and action “n” otherwise. The ratio of the utility 
values -ui(-c)/ ui(g) determines i!
E
. This utility difference may then be interpreted as the risk 
aversion of player i. In the experiment the parameter values are c=10 and g=20 so that a risk 
neutral player would have a 
___ E
&  of ½.  
 
/he Stationary eEuili8rium of Came II 
 
A stationary equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with time invariant choices of the players. The 
best-reply condition is given by the Bellman equations. In the model of this paper the 
interaction of the players is incorporated in the definition of the equilibrium by a parameter µi 
which is individual i`s belief about the probability that her money gets accepted. This rate 
reduces the effective success probability, a combination of the exogenous discounting ß and 
µi.  
 
Iefinition 19 
 
A stationary equilibrium for Game II consists of 
 
* *
ibeliefes , and choices  R  {n, a}, i 1,...,N'9 : "  
such that: 
 
i) :K K' 'L &'(&"*1'5+-&2';$#&9  
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 K'L & .6-.'--(&14$&M$--5+#&$F6+1'"#(  
 
 $% )(B!V  (-c)u (A),!Vmax(A)V iiian,i '"  
 
 * *i i i i i iV (B) (1 µ ) V (B) µ [u (g) !V (A)]&" ) ' '  
 
ii) * * *1 is consistent with (R ,..., ) :' EL9  
 
 Let  % $% $* \ : K' N# N E ' L #) " : "  then 08
0
2
-
7
1
,
"
O
#8G&&
K
8'K
'
2
10max9  
 
 
 
 
Note that * N0   if at least    players choose n
2'
9 " . This is because the players that choose n 
will almost surely get stuck in group A. If n*-i is below N/2 the probability *'9 increases 
proportionally with n*-i . Furthermore, note that I1,...,i    )0 ,( *i
* """ 9#L'  is always an 
equilibrium. That is to say for all parameter values the non-monetary equilibrium is always 
one possible outcome of the game. 
 
Solution of the 4ellman eEuations 
The Bellmann equations for agent i are: 
$% i i i,( ) max V (A), u (-c)  V (B)' # +I J & &" '  
 
( ) (1 )[ ( )] [ ( ) ( )]' ' ' ' ' 'I M I M 6 2 I J9 & 9 &" ) ' '  
 
First we use the second equation to eliminate Vi(B) from the first equation: 
 
i i i
i
i
µ [u (g) !V (A)]     V (B)
1 !(1 µ )
'
; "
) )
 
Hence we obtain: 
i i
i i
[u (g) V (A)]( ) max V (A), u (-c)  
1 (1 )
'
'
'
I J 9 && &
& 9
, -. /'0 0" '1 23 4) ) 6050 87
 
 
 
Now suppose n is optimal then i( ) ( )        V (A) 0' 'I J I J&" < "  
The condition for this to be true is: (1 (1 )) ( )  ( ) 0' ' ' '6 3 6 2& 9 &9) ) ) ' +  
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Which is equivalent to ( ) [  ( ) (1 ) ( ) 0' ' ' ' '6 3 6 2 6 3& 9 9) ' ) ) ) +  
Hence we obtain the cut off beta as: 
 
__
II i
i
i i i i
u ( c)(2) ! max 1,min 0,
µ u (g) (1 µ )u ( c)
, -. /) )0 0" 1 23 4) ) )0 05 67 8
 
 
Some remarks are in order: Suppose in (2) we have 0'9 " , i.e. the player i will never find 
someone who accepts his money. Then n is his best response. To the other extreme, suppose 
1'9 "  then the cut off beta is as n Game I. Also, observe that beta is decreasing in 
i i iff u (g)  -u (-c)'9 ( . which must be true for any player in order to have him play “a”. 
 
 
Finally note that there is always a non-monetary equilibrium in which nobody accepts money 
while we obtain monetary, i.e. equilibria in which some accept money, if some conditions on 
the utility functions of the agents that determine their cut-off- values are met. Those 
conditions will be given in detail below. 
 
J. EKperiment 
 
In Game I we test how the participants solve the optimization task under uncertainty without 
any strategic or social considerations. The first theoretical prediction is that for every 
continuation probability they choose never come back strategies. Moreover for alternative 
betas the participants use strategies which are only characterized by a cut-off value. 
 
The difference between Game I and Game II is that in Game II strategic and social 
considerations might be important since the decision of a participant also depends on the 
decisions of other participants.  The theory presented above only takes strategic 
considerations into account. Social aspects like reciprocity are not included. We will compare 
the results of Game II with the results of Game I to analyze whether the difference in behavior 
can be explained by strategic considerations. 
 
Additional experimental findings will be explained after the testing of the three hypotheses 
deduced from the theory presented in the last parts. 
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We first derive and test those hypotheses of the model without including reciprocity 
(described in the last part) to point at findings not explainable by standard theory. Then we 
discuss the findings and modify the standard model to include reciprocity. The three main 
predictions of stationary behavior that are valid for Game I and Game II are: if an agent 
chooses action “n” once, she will choose it in every period thereafter (Hypothesis 1), the 
action choice does not depend on the period (Hypothesis 2) and every strategy is only 
characterized by a cut-off value (
I
i  & in Game I and"
II
i  & in game II given the choices of the 
other players (for fixed µ)): for !’s below this cut-off value strategy “n” is chosen, above 
strategy “a” is chosen (Hypothesis 3). The last two hypotheses concern the changes between 
Game I and II caused by strategic considerations. The individual cut-off rate does not change 
from the individual decision making experiment to the market game if in the market game all 
agents accept money (Hypothesis 4). The last hypothesis deals with the way agents react on 
the other agents choosing action “n” in game II. The theoretical prediction is that agents 
should react on the relative frequency of being disappointed to get an estimator of their µ* 
value (Hypothesis 5).  
 
 The first three hypotheses concern the stationary behavior in Game I and Game II as it is 
obtained from solving the Bellman equations for theses games (compare section 3.2.1). 
 
2ypothesis 1 LNo re-enteringO9 
If a player chooses action “n” once, she will choose it in every period thereafter. 
 
2ypothesis 2 LStationary ChoicesO9 
The choice of an action does not depend on the period. 
 
2ypothesis J LCut-off value strategiesO9 
The only parameter in the strategy of  an agent is the cut-off value. 
Game I: For discounting rates ß < 
I
i  & action „n“ is chosen, for ß > 
I
i  & action „a“ is 
chosen. For risk neutrality the cut-off value is 0.5. Game II: For discounting rates ß < 
II
i  & action „n“ is chosen, for ß > 
II
i  &  action „a“ is chosen (if µ
*&is fix).  
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2ypothesis 4 LConstant Cut-off valuesO9 
The cut-off values 
I
i  & in Game I, (that characterizes the risk aversion of a player) are equal 
to the cut-off values 
II
i  &  in Game II, if all agents choose action  “a”. 
 
 
2ypothesis 5 LRelative FreEuency IependenceO9 
In equilibrium the optimization of an agent depends on the µ value (which gives the 
probability that his money will be accepted). Since this depends on the strategic choices of the 
other agents, an agent has to get an estimation of this value. An estimator should be the 
relative frequency of “being disappointed” (one’s money has not been accepted). 
The hypothesis is: The decision of the participants to choose action “a” (or “n”) depends on 
the observed relative frequency of “being disappointed”. 
 
 
!ethod 
 
In the experiments 48 students from a variety of fields from the University of Zurich were the 
participants. They were recruited by announcements in the university promising monetary 
reward contingent on performance in a group decision making experiment. The participants 
got points as payoffs. 1 point was 0.1 CHF (~$ 0.07). The average payoff of a participant was 
40 SFr (~$ 29). 
 
The experimental software was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher (1999)). The experiments 
were conducted in the computer laboratories of the University of Zurich. The participants 
were randomly assigned to the seats in the laboratory. The experiment lasted approximately 
90 minutes with the first 20 minutes consisting of orientation and instructions. The 
instructions were provided in written form (see Appendix A for the English translation). The 
experiment started with the instructions on the structure of the Game I and a learning phase in 
which the participants played single games. Game I was played without interaction between 
the participants at computer terminals. After having played Game I were finished the 
participants received the instructions of Game II. Game II was played in 6 groups of 8 
participants via computer terminals1. The computer terminals were well separated from one 
                                                          
1 In the learning phase small amounts of money were the payoffs. The participants received not more than 10% 
of their total payoff from these games. 
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another preventing communication between the participants. In the experiment the 
participants played both games for the following values of the parameters that all participants 
knew: the maximal number of periods was 702, ! was 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 or 
0.9.  
 
Players paid 10 points if they choose action “a” and provided a service and they received 20 
points if they benefited from the service. The cost ui(-c) was ui(-10 points) and the benefit 
ui(g) was ui(20 points). In the experiment we did not use the terms “accepting money” or “not 
accepting money” for producing a good, because payoff (utility) was in Swiss Francs and we 
did not want to confuse the participants with two kinds of money. For the payoff and the 
money in the experiment see Appendix A. Positive utility was obtained from getting 20 
points, the effort was framed as paying 10 points.  
 
In the laboratory we implemented the discounting rate ! as the probability ! that the game 
continues after every period (it ends with probability 1-ß). From a theoretical point of view 
the results do not depend on the interpretation of ß as a discounting rate or a continuation 
probability. The chance move whether the game ends or not was performed by rolling a 10-
sided dice which was observable by the participants.           
 
In every period of Game I the participants were informed about the result of the chance move 
and their payoff in the period before and their total payoff. 
 
At the beginning of the game, in Game II participants were randomly assigned to group A and 
group B. Every period one agent from group 1 was randomly matched with one agent in 
group B. If a transaction occurred the partners changed groups.  
 
At the beginning of each period the participants were informed about the result of the chance 
move (whether the game continues), their payoff in the last period, their total payoff and the 
group (A or B) in which they are. They were not informed about any characteristic of the 
other participants like their scores or their choices. Moreover, the participants could not 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
2 We selected 70 as the maximal number of periods, because it is known from experimental studies that 
participants do not perform backward induction for games with so many periods. In most cases they do not 
perform backward induction for more than 5 periods. It seems plausible that the participants act in a 70 period 
game (Game I) as in the game with infinitely many periods if the last periods are not reached. 
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identify other participants. They did not know whether they played against a partner before.  
All information was given on the computer screen. 
 
After the learning phase a strategy game was played. All participants selected their strategies 
for all games. The strategies could depend on the parameters of Game I and also on the whole 
past of a play of the game, especially on ß, on the period and on the relative or the absolute 
number of being disappointed (a detailed description of the strategy game is given in the 
Appendix A). One game was paid per type of Game I and per person. The participants were 
assigned to each other randomly in Game II. They were informed about this procedure. 
 
After the experiment was completed each participant was separately paid in cash contingent 
on her performance.  
 
 
 Results 
 
Both games were played for several discounting rates to determine the cut-off discounting 
rates.  If all other agents in Game II choose action “a” an agent faces the same problem as in 
Game I. If not all other agents select action “a” an agent has to take additional discounting 
into account. In Game II we determine the cut-off discounting rates and compare these with 
the ones obtained in Game I to test Hypothesis 4 and 5.   
 
For a test of the predictions we analyze the strategy game. In doing this, we use the results of 
the strategy game, because we are interested in the behavior of experienced players and want 
to minimize the effects of learning. We also wanted to get behavior conditional on the actions 
of the other players to test our hypotheses concerning reciprocity. We obtain this conditional 
behavior from the strategies of the players. Another reason to use a strategy game is that we 
cannot observe a full strategy of a player in a single game since the chance move will stop the 
game after several periods and the important parts of the strategy would not be observed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17
Came I 
 
The observed strategies in Game I are of three types. 
Type 1: A participant using this strategy chooses action “a” for all periods or action “n” such 
that for 
I
i   & &=  action “n” and for i  
E
& &(  action “a” is chosen. She has a cut-off 
value i 
E
& . 
Type 2: The participant using this strategy always chooses action “n”, if i  
E
& &= .If 
i  
E
& &( she chooses action “a” for at most 15 periods. 
Type 3:  This participant always chooses action “n”, if i  
E
& &= , but with increasing ß the 
number of periods she chooses action “a” increases. 
 
34 of the 48 strategies were of type 1, the rest were of type 2 and 3. In a Test2 )>  the 
hypothesis that the types occur with the same probability is rejected on the 5%-level. This 
supports our Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. We conclude that we observe stationary behavior in 
Game I. In the next sections we analyze these stationary strategies. Types 2 and 3 are 
compatible with the equilibrium prediction if one assumes a dependence of the decision on 
the payoffs accumulated in former periods as discussed for the solution of the Bellman 
equation in section 3.1. 
 
Figure 3a shows the distribution of the cut-off values i
E
& . We observe strong heterogeneity 
which we attribute to the solution of the Bellman equations according to the shape of the 
utility functions of the players. The median of i
E
&  is 0.5. This is the prediction obtained 
under the assumption of risk neutrality. Taking 0.5 as a benchmark for risk neutral behavior 
40 % of the subjects are risk averse, 40% are risk seeking and 20% are risk neutral as can be 
seen in Figure 3b. 
 18
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
"#$%&''!()*#+,
-+
./
+0
$)
1+
!&
'!-
+.
,&
0,
 
 
 
Figure 3:  a: The cumulative distribution of the cut-off values i
E
&   in Game I. 
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   b: The frequencies of risk averse, risk neutral and risk seeking players. 
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Came II 
 
We compare the results of Game II with the results of Game I to test the Hypotheses 4 (The 
cut-off values 
I
i  & in Game I are equal to the cut-off values 
II
i  &  in Game II, if all agents 
choose action “a”). For this comparison only the strategies conditional on the fact that all 
other agents participate are important. Concerning Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 for this case the 
same behavior as in Game I is observed. Since all stationary strategies in Game I are also 
stationary for the condition that all other agent accept money.  
 
To test Hypothesis 4 we look at the medians of the cut-off discounting rates i 
E
& depending 
on the absolute number of being disappointed. We compare the results of Game I with the 
results of Game II for the case that a player has never been disappointed (which corresponds 
to Game I). The actions of the other players are such that they do not reduce ß. Figure 4 shows 
the cumulative distribution of the cut-off discounting rates for the cases that an agent has 
never been disappointment which are the cut-off values. 
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Figure 4: The cumulative distribution of the cut-off discounting rates in Game II for the 
 case that a player has never been disappointed (corresponding to Game I). 
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 If a player has never been disappointed the median of the cut-off discounting rate is 0.3 
(compared with 0.5 in Game I, see Figure 3a). Hence in the market game for all ß > 0.3 the 
median player continues to accept money while in the individual choice experiment only for 
continuation probabilities of at least 0.5 the median player accepts money. For a test of 
Hypothesis 4 we take the medians of the six independent groups. All medians show a 
decrease of the cut-off values. In a one-sided binomial test the hypothesis that   i&  increases 
or is constant from Game I to II is rejected on the 2%-level. We therefore have the following 
experimental finding about the difference between individual optimization and a market.  
 
Finding 1: The cut-off values decrease from the individual optimization (Game I) to the 
market (Game II). Hence accepting money is a more likely outcome in the market. 
 
Figure 5 shows the medians of the cut-off discounting rate dependent on the absolute number 
a player has been disappointed. The median conditional on being disappointed once is the 
same as in Game I which supports our experimental finding 1. After being disappointed for 
four times the cut-off discounting rate is 100% which corresponds to a break down of the 
monetary system. 
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Figure 5: The medians of the cut-off discounting rate in Game II for different values of  
     the absolute number of being disappointed. 
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For a test of Hypothesis 5 we analyze whether the strategies of the participants depend on the 
absolute number of being disappointed or on the relative frequency. Table 2 shows the 
distribution:  28.6% of the strategies depend on the relative frequency and 71.4% depend on 
the absolute number. In a Test)2> the hypothesis that it is equally likely that the strategy of 
a player depends on the relative frequency or on the absolute number is rejected on the 2% 
level. Assuming only independence of the 6 groups we compare whether the majority of the 
strategies in each group depends on the relative frequency or the absolute number. In 6 of 6 
groups the majority of the strategies depend on the absolute number. In a one-sided binomial 
test the hypothesis that the probability that the majority of the strategies depend on the 
relative frequency is equal to or higher than the probability that the strategies depend on the 
absolute number is rejected on the 2% level.  
 
 
Relative frequency of being disappointed 
determines the strategy 
Absolute number of being 
disappointed determines the strategy 
28,6% 71,4% 
 
 
Table 2:  Dependence of the strategies on the absolute number and the relative  
frequency of being disappointed 
 
 
We therefore obtain the following experimental finding.  
 
Finding 29 The choice of the action “n” depends on the absolute number of being 
disappointed in the market (Game II) and not on the relative frequency. Every player who is 
disappointed 4 or more times will always choose action “n”.  
 
It should be noted that if not all agents accept money we do not have stationary strategies. We 
can reject Hypotheses 2 and 3 for these strategies since the strategic choice additionally 
depends on the history of a play: the absolute number of being disappointed. This is in 
contradiction to the stationary equilibrium prediction. 
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4. Possi8le reasons for different 8ehavior in the market LCame IIO as compared to the 
individual optimiTation pro8lem LCame IO. 
 
To understand the experimental Findings 1 and 2 we analyze the following considerations. 
Strategic reasoning, social conventions and indirect reciprocity might explain our Finding 1. 
We therefore look at the implications of these possible influence factors. For an explanation 
of our Finding 2 we also look at the implications of negative reciprocity. 
 
Finding 19 /he cut-off value decreases from individual optimiTation to a market 
Players might think that in a market they should choose action “a” for i  
EE
& &= (different 
from the individual optimization)&to influence others to do the same which would then raise 
their own expected payoffs. However, this is not justifiable by standard rationality, because 
for any number of players following this rule their profit is lower than in the equilibrium 
given by the individual optimization. The payoff given by individual optimization is the 
maximal possible payoff in this game, because the success probability cannot be greater than 
ß (exogenously given in the game) which is the same as in the individual optimization 
problem. 
A social convention, as for example playing cooperative in a prisoner’s dilemma game, which 
gives more to all players might change the behavior in the game. This convention might be a 
non equilibrium strategy combination with higher payoffs for all players. But again, sticking 
to the standard utility functions, the payoff in the game cannot be higher than in the individual 
optimization problem, because in the game the probability of continuing cannot be greater 
than the exogenous discounting rate ß for which the payoff of a player is maximal. 
More formally, comparing the cut off values for Game I and Game II, as they are given in the 
equations (1) and (2) respectively, we observe that:  
 
Proposition 19 
E.&14$&2+5$&'(&*-+%$)&+1&+--G&':$:&'.&P6'>83?Q6'>2?&14$#&14$&3618"..&;+-6$&'#&R+5$&EE&'(&#"1&(5+--$/&
14+#&14$&3618"..&;+-6$&'#&R+5$&E:&E:$:&S#9&'(&*-+%$)&5"/$&-'T$-%&'#&R+5$&EE&14+#&'#&R+5$&:&
&
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iGiven any  u  we get   if and only if :
E EE
' '& &+  
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i i
i i i i i
-u (-c) u ( c)  
u (g) µ  u (g)-(1-µ ) u (-c))
& ) )* + i i i  u (g) u (g)-(1- )u (-c)' '9 9* (  
 
Dividing both sides by (1 )'9) gives: i i(1- )u (g) -(1- )u (-c)' '9 9(  which is equivalent to 
i iu (g) -u (-c)( . 
 
WXY:&
&
A further explanation might be herding: participants accept money, because all others accept 
money. This explanation is problematic because of two reasons. The first reason is that 
participants do not observe the behavior of the others or at least of a majority of the others. 
They only know what result their strategic choice has had in every past period. Therefore, 
they cannot follow the majority. Even if one did argue that they infer all others accept money 
from the fact that they have never been disappointed in the past, the experimental results are 
not in line with this explanation. On average the behavior in Game I is the same as in Game II 
if a participant has been disappointed once. Even if a participant knows that at least one other 
person does not accept money she still plays as in Game I. Why should she do this knowing 
that she would not be the only one who does not accept money? 
 
Since the reasons given so far seem to be inappropriate we now analyze indirect reciprocity as 
a reason for Finding 1. For a better understanding one might look at the trust game (Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe (1995)) or the helping game (Seinen and Schramm (2001), Engelmann 
and Fischbacher (2002)). In a helping game the influence of indirect reciprocity is tested. We 
compare the helping game with Game II (for the case of N persons with identical utility 
function ui). In the helping game in every period the players are randomly assigned to groups 
A and B. Every period the players have to make the same decisions as in Game II (depending 
on the group). The helping game is played for a fixed number of periods without discounting 
(ß=1). The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a helping game is that all players choose 
action “n” (which corresponds to not helping). In an experimental study (Engelmann and 
Fischbacher (2002)) indirect reciprocal behavior was observed even if participants could not 
build a reputation. They helped (which corresponds to choosing action “a”) although they 
were rematched in the next period. This is a deviation from the Nash equilibrium which (if 
both players stick to the deviation) increases their payoffs.  
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Our game II is similar to the helping game analyzed in (Engelmann and Fischbacher (2002), 
since reputation building is not possible. Therefore, indirect reciprocity has to be considered. 
Nevertheless, Game II is different from a helping game in several aspects. For certain 
parameter constellations choosing action “a” is a Nash equilibrium. The discounting rate in 
the helping game is ß=1. If ß<1 the argument that agents improve their payoffs by choosing 
action “a” does not hold any longer since the game might not end after the next period. A 
player (with given utility function) obtains the maximal expected payoff (utility) if all other 
players chose action “a”. We therefore choose this case which corresponds to Game I as 
reference point in our analysis. Our finding is that even compared with this case (Game I) we 
observe deviations from the theory without reciprocity.  
 
To discuss the effect of reciprocity we first have a look at existing theories of reciprocity 
(Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and references therein, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and references 
therein, Rabin (1993), Charness and Rabin (2000), Cox (2002)). In principal, in the Fehr-
Schmidt and Bolton-Ockenfels approach the participants obtain positive utility from inequity 
aversion. We say outcomes are “fairer” if inequity is avoided. The explanation of our findings 
will be based on these theories. Since the Fehr Schmidt model of reciprocity is much easier to 
work with, we have decided to state and proof our propositions using that formulation of 
reciprocity. Other theories are based on different preferences or intentions. For example 
altruism is based on the idea that a participant helps the others whatever they do to him. This 
is clearly in contradiction to our Finding 3. Moreover, unconditional spiteful behavior is 
refuted by our Finding 2.  
 
The Fehr Schmidt Theory of reciprocity is based on the idea that due to social comparisons 
the utility decreases if one has a lower payoff than the other participants (envy) and also it 
decreases if one has a higher payoff than the other participants (altruism). The degree of the 
relative importance of these two aspects of social comparison can be adjusted by choice of 
some positive parameters ei and ai, respectively. The measures for lower and higher payoffs 
are given by the sum of the distance to one`s own payoff. Finally, the utility function is 
additively separable between utility from one`s own payoff, ui(xi) and the disutility from 
social comparisions, which results is reciprocity, ri(x1,…,xI): 
 
% $ % $i 1 1u ( ,..., ) ( ) ( ,..., ) ( ) max ,0 max ,01 1
' '
O ' ' ' O ' ' N ' ' N
N ' N '
$ ,0 0 6 0 / 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
O O? ?
" ' " ) ) ) )
) )# #
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Note, that Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have assumed ( )' ' '6 0 0" , which is unnecessarily 
restrictive in our setting since agents may be risk averse. Finally, we keep the normalization 
made above: (0) 0'6 " . 
 
In our setting reciprocity can be considered with respect to social comparisons to the payoff 
the other player gets in the matching in a certain period or with respect to the payoff all other 
players receive in the stationary equilibrium. We will call the first notion myopic reciprocity 
while we refer to the second notion as indirect reciprocity. It will turn out that myopic 
reciprocity is contradicted by our Finding 2 because in this case when playing “a” one would 
suffer from the other player getting a higher payoff than oneself. If however the participants 
anticipate the equilibrium payoffs of the other players then indirect reciprocity induces them 
to more likely play “a” because one only gets a chance to play “a” if more than the majority of 
the other players also play “a”. A detailed analysis is given now: 
 
Iefinition 29 
 
A stationary equilibrium with myopic reciprocity for Game II consists of 
 
* *
ibeliefes , and choices  R  {n, a}, i 1,...,N'9 : "  
 
such that: 
 
i) ! :K K' 'L &'(&"*1'5+-&2';$#&   
 
 K'L & .6-.'--(&14$&M$--5+#&$F6+1'"#(  
 
 $%i i i i i in,aV (A) max r (0,0)+!V (A), u (-c)+r (-c,g)  !V (B)" '  
 
 * *i i i i i i i iV (B) (1 µ )[r (0,0)+ V (B)] µ [u (g)+r (g,-c) !V (A)]&" ) ' '  
 
ii) : ),...;(R with consistent is **1
*
E' L9  
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Note that according to Fehr and Schmidt we get the following restrictions on the values for 
reciprocity: 
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(0,0) 0, ( , ) 0, ( , ) 0' ' '/ / 2 3 / 3 2" ) = ) = . Z$#3$G&14$&"*1'5+- policy is derived from: 
$%i i i i in,aV (A) max !V (A), u (-c)+r (-c,g)  !V (B)" '  
 
* *
i i i i i i iV (B) (1 µ )[ V (B)] µ [u (g)+r (g,-c) !V (A)]&" ) ' '  
 
Note that these Bellman equations have the same structure as the Bellman equations of Game 
II without reciprocity, except that the payoffs [ui(-c), ui(g)] have been replaced by the payoffs 
with reciprocity, [ui(-c)+ri(-c,g),ui(g)+ri(g,-c)]. Thus, doing the same substitution in the 
formula (2) for the cut off values we get for the cut off value in case of myopic reciprocity: 
 
@ A @ A
mr__
i i
i
i i i i i i
u ( c)  r ( , )(2) ! min 1,max 0,
µ u (g) + r ( , ) (1 µ ) u ( c) + r ( , )
3 2
2 3 3 2
, -. /) ) ) )0 0" 1 23 4) ) ) ) )0 05 67 8
&
 
Comparison with the cut off value 
II__
i!  from before shows that for the same '9 the participants 
are now more likely to play “n”:  
 
Proposition 29 
In the Game II with myopic reciprocity the cut-off values are not smaller than in Game II 
without reciprocity. 
 
Proof: 
 
__ __
u ( c)  r ( , ) u ( c) i i i
µ u (g) + r ( , ) (1 µ ) u ( c) + r ( , ) µ u (g) (1 µ ) u ( c)i i i i i i i i i i
u ( c)  r ( , ) µ u (g) (1 µ ) u ( c)i i i i i i
 if and only if 
5/ EE
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3 2
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. / . / . / . /
3 4 3 4 3 4 3 45 6 5 6 5 6 5 6
. / . / . /
3 4 3 4 35 6 5 6 5 6
) ) ) ) ) )
(
) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
) ) ) ) ) ) )
(
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u ( c) µ u (g) + r ( , ) (1 µ ) u ( c) + r ( , )i i i i i i i
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
which is true since the left hand side expression is positive while the right hand side is n
2 3 3 2
/ 3 2 6 2 6 3 / 2 3' ' ' '
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Recall that ( , ),  ( , ) and ( )  are negative while ( ) is positive!' ' '/ 3 2 / 2 3 6 3 6 2) ) )
QED. 
 
Intuitively speaking, one does not like to play “a” because in the very moment one chooses 
“a” one is envious that the partner in this matching gets a higher payoff. One also gets a 
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smaller utility as compared to the case without reciprocity in the reverse situation because 
then one suffers from altruism due to the fact that the new partner gets a lower payoff.  
 
Moreover, note that this induces the success probability µ*i to decrease in the stationary 
equilibrium. Hence the effect is reinforced and for every given continuation probability ! 
fewer players play “a” : 
 
Proposition J9 
For all continuation probabilities, in the monetary equilibrium in Game II with myopic 
reciprocity at least as many players do not accept money as in the monetary equilibrium 
without reciprocity. 
 
Proof: 
By Proposition 2, for the same acceptance probabilities µi , the cut off values with reciprocity 
are not smaller than without. Hence in the game without reciprocity the equilibrium 
acceptance probabilities µ*i are not smaller than with myopic reciprocity. Moreover, as shown 
above, if we are in a monetary equilibrium and accepting money is an option, i.e. if 
( ) ( )' '6 2 6 3( ) ) , then the cut-off values in the game without reciprocity increase in µ*i . 
Hence, the initial effect is reinforced and it can only be that at least as many players accept 
money in the game without reciprocity as compared to the one with myopic reciprocity. 
QED. 
 
In the notion of reciprocity that we consider next one evaluate one`s own payoff compared to 
the $F6'-',/'65&payoff of all other players -- those one is matched with currently and those 
one is matched with later or one is never matched with. This notion of reciprocity is less 
myopic but also more indirect:  
 
Iefinition J9 
 
A stationary equilibrium with indirect reciprocity for Game II consists of 
 
* *
ibeliefes , and choices  R  {n, a}, i 1,...,N'9 : "  such that: 
 
i) ! :K K' 'L &'(&"*1'5+-&2';$#&   
 
 K'L & .6-.'--(&14$&M$--5+#&$F6+1'"#(  
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iii) The stationary equilibrium payoffs are given by: 
 
*
n a* *
i
i ip  = 0, p = ,  i=1,...,N.1
3 2& 9
&
) '
)
&&&&&
In this concept of reciprocity whenever one has played “n” or “a” and gets an instantaneous 
utility one also suffers from the social comparison of one`s own equilibrium payoff compared 
to the equilibrium payoff of all other players. Solving the Bellman equations is now a bit 
more tedious but as the following lemma shows the solution is still quite intuitive: 
 
Uemma 29 
 
Consider the Bellman equations 
 
* * * *
n n a a
i i i \i i i i i \i in,a
V (A) max r ( p ,p ) + !V (A), u (-c) + r ( p ,p )  !V (B), -" '1 2
7 8
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* n n * a a
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Then “n” is the agent`s best choice provided 
__ /
' '& &+ , where 
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The proof of Lemma 2 is given in the Appendix B. 
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EE
'& we get that 
in symmetric equilibria  is never smaller than  / EE' '& & while in asymmetric equilibria this can 
be ensured by assuming that the envy parameter is not larger than the altruism parameters and 
the exogenous continuation probability is not larger than the ratio of the loss to the gain : 
&
Proposition 49 
In every symmetric equilibrium of the Game II with indirect reciprocity, the cut-off values are 
not smaller than in Game II without reciprocity. Moreover the same holds  
a) in a non-monetary asymmetric equilibrium if e b+ , while 
b) in a monetary asymmetric equilibrium this holds if  e b( and 3
2
& + . 
 
Proof: 
=/"5&\$55+&]&'#&J**$#)'0&M&7$&($$&14+1& / EE' '& &( */";')$)&
a n* * * *
i \i i \ii ir ( p , p ) r ( p ,p )( :&
B4$/$&,%&\$55+&^&'#&J**$#)'0&M&+&(6..'3'$#1&3"#)'1'"#&."/&14'(&'#$F6+-'1%&'(&14+1V&
We are in a symmetric equilibrium or we are 
a) in a non-monetary asymmetric equilibrium and  e b+ , while 
b) in a monetary asymmetric equilibrium and  e b( and 3
2
& + . 
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Moreover, note that fewer players choosing “n” induces the success probability µ*i to increase 
in the stationary equilibrium. Hence the effect is reinforced and for every given continuation 
probability ! more players play “a”.&&
&
Proposition 59 
For all continuation probabilities, in every symmetric monetary equilibrium in Game II with 
indirect reciprocity at least as many players do accept money as in the symmetric monetary 
equilibrium without reciprocity and the same holds also for asymmetric monetary equilibria, 
provided i ie b  for all i=1,...,I(  and 
3
2
& + . 
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Proof: 
By Proposition 4, under the conditions stated, for the same acceptance probabilities µi , the 
cut-off values with indirect reciprocity are not smaller than without. Hence in the game 
without reciprocity the equilibrium acceptance probabilities µ*i are not larger than with 
indirect reciprocity. Moreover, as shown above, if we are in a monetary equilibrium and 
accepting money is an option, i.e. if ( ) ( )' '6 2 6 3( ) ) , the cut off values in the game without 
reciprocity decrease in µ*i . Hence, the initial effect is reinforced and it can only be that at 
least as many players accept money in the game with indirect reciprocity as compared to the 
one without reciprocity. 
QED. 
 
We therefore conclude that indirect reciprocity is an explanation of our Finding 1 according to 
which the cut-off values decrease in the market game. This is definitely the case for 
symmetric equilibria. But indirect reciprocity also seems to make an asymmetric equilibrium 
“fairer”. Less inequity is achieved by reciprocity: Suppose a majority of the other players has 
chosen to accept money but, not considering reciprocity you would choose to play “n” for the 
given exogenous continuation probability !. Then considering reciprocity you are willing to 
also play “a” because by doing so you decrease the utility loss from reciprocity. 
 
As an effect those players who benefited from other players choosing “a” tend to chose “a” 
for smaller continuation probabilities because by doing this the overall distribution of payoffs 
becomes more equal. Another possible equilibrium is that all players choose “n”, but this 
equilibrium is not achieved by considerations about indirect reciprocity, since choosing action 
“n” instead of action “a” only reduces the total payoff of a player, if action “a” gives her 
positive payoff without considering reciprocity. We discuss the influence of reciprocity when 
agents condition on the absolute number of being disappointed in the next section.  
 
Finding 29 /he choices of players depend on the a8solute num8er of 8eing disappointed 
 
The discussion of the cases in which indirect reciprocity can occur is similar to the one for 
indirect reciprocity. Negative reciprocity can only occur in an asymmetric equilibrium. But 
the consequences of negative reciprocity are different from the ones of indirect reciprocity. 
We consider the case that in a period a player for whom it is optimal in an equilibrium to 
choose action “a” does not get the payoff ui(g), because it is not optimal for the player she is 
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matched with to pay ui(-c). How will the first player react if this happened two or three times? 
It is known from experimental studies (Fehr, Schmidt (1999) and references therein, Bolton, 
Ockenfels (2000) and references therein) that she will punish the others. The only way to 
punish the others is to choose action “n” which reduces the payoffs of the other players. This 
form of punishment depends on the absolute number with which the player has been 
disappointed in the former periods and not on the relative frequency as an attempt to estimate 
the probability of the value&!'&in equilibrium would suggest. The maximal absolute number 
which is necessary for the punishment is 4 in the experiment. We conclude that negative 
reciprocity is an explanation of our Finding 2. 
 
A counter argument to our finding and explanation might be that the reaction will not depend 
on the absolute number of being disappointed if being disappointed for 4 times happens 
within 1000000 periods. This might be true, but persons have a limited short term memory. 
Therefore they will not remember the 4 times. A restriction to our finding might be that the 
number of being disappointed has to occur within the capacity of the short term memory 
which includes the influence of proportional updating, but it is by no means as proposed by 
rational behavior. Therefore the interpretation of this behavior as negative reciprocity should 
be still valid and the consequence discussed in the next paragraph should also hold. 
 
A consequence of this form of punishment is that it will cause a breakdown of choosing 
action “a”, if only one player chooses action “n”. If all players play strategies of the type of 
finding 2 and only one player chooses “n”, in a stationary equilibrium all players choose “n”. 
This leads to a non monetary equilibrium. The breakdown is caused by the fact that after some 
periods a second player has been disappointed for enough times and will also choose action 
“a”. After some periods a third player will punish and choose action “n”. This will continue 
until all players choose action “n”. This argument only depends on the fact that the 
punishment depends on the absolute number of being disappointed.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The main theoretical results of this paper are that for the market considered a stationary 
equilibrium can be defined and characterized. In particular agents’ strategies are allowed to be 
heterogeneous. Monetary and non monetary equilibria exist depending on the discounting rate 
and the utility functions of the players. The main characteristics of monetary equilibria are 
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that the strategies depend only on a cut-off probability of a player. Every period she chooses 
the same strategy in a game with fixed discounting rate. With decreasing discounting rate the 
choice of accepting money becomes more favorable. Indirect reciprocity causes a decrease in 
the cut-off probabilities of the players in an equilibrium as compared to the individual 
optimization game.  
Punishment due to negative reciprocity causes a dependence of the strategies on the absolute 
number of being disappointed and not on the relative frequency as expected for the updating 
of the individual discounting rate. This dependence causes the break down of a monetary 
system if only one player does not accept money because with probability one every other 
player will be matched to this player infinitely often. 
 
Hence due to indirect reciprocity a monetary system is more stable than individual rationality 
would suggest, provided every participant considers accepting money as a reasonable option. 
If however some participants notoriously refuse to accept money then due to negative 
reciprocity their behavior will eventually induce a break down of the monetary system. 
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AppendiK A 
Instructions 
Cames on payoff under risk 
 
We would like to welcome you at the Institute of Empirical Economics. You will participate 
in games on payoffs under risk. You will play different types of games: Type A and type B. 
 
 
/ype A 
 
You have a point account. The initial balance of the account is B=20 points. The game is 
played in periods and last maximally 70 periods. Each period you have to make the following 
choice: 
 
You choose:  
„keep“: the game ends und you receive the points on your account as payoff 
 
or 
 
„give away“: 10 points are subtracted from your account and a 10-sided dice is 
rolled: 
for 1,2,3,4,5: the game ends and you receive the points on your account 
as payoff.  
for 6,7,8,9,10:  your account is increased by B=20 points; the game 
continues and you choose again in the next period. 
             (The probability of ending the game is 50%). 
 
The results of the rolling of the dice for which the game ends will change between different 
runs of this game. This will be announced at the beginning of each run.                             
                                                                                                                               . 
  
                                                                                                                                                      
/ype 4 
 
You are in a group of 8 persons. Each person has B=20 points on her account. The group is 
randomly split into two groups A and B of 4 persons. The game maximally lasts 70 periods. 
Each period every person in group A decides whether to give away 10 points or not. 
 
If a person gives away 10 points the following happens: 
- one person from group B gets B=20 points and switches to group A. This person is 
randomly selected from all persons in group B. Every person in group B can only get 20 
points once a period.  
- the person, who gave away 10 points, switches to group B. 
 
Then a 10-sided dice decides whether the game ends or not. 
For 1,2,3,4,5 the game ends and you get the points on your account. For 6,7,8,9,10 a further 
period is played. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
payoff: 100 points are 100 Swiss Francs. 
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Strategy game 
 
In this game you indicate your choices in the games of type A and B for all periods in 
advance. Please determine your choice depending on the probability that the game ends and 
for which choices of the other players you choose “keep” or “give away”. Your choice can 
also depend on the balance on the point account and/or on the period. This is how you 
determine your decision for a further game which is automatically carried out according to 
your strategy. 
One game of type A and of type B is carried out and paid. 10 points correspond to 100 Swiss 
centimes Lprevious payoff times 10). 
 
/ype A9 
 
The probability of ending the game is determined by a 10-sided dice. 
The probability of ending the game of 20% is: for 1 and 2 the game ends, and so on. 
 
Please fill in which period you choose ”keep“. 
 
Probability of ending the game 10
% 
20
% 
30
% 
40
% 
50
% 
60
% 
70
% 
80
% 
90
% 
“keep“ in period: 
 
         
 
/ype 49  
 
Fill in when you choose “keep“ or “give away“. You may either use table a) or table b) or 
create your answer in the form you prefer. Please choose the table you prefer or give your 
answer. 
aO  
Fill in when you choose “keep“ or g“give away“. 
 
Probability of ending the game 
Relative frequency you 
did not get 20 points* 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
0 of 10          
1 of 10          
2 of 10          
3 of 10          
4 of 10          
5 of 10          
6 of 10          
7 of 10          
8 of 10          
9 of 10          
10 of 10          
*when you were in group B 
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or 
 
8O 
 
 
Probability of ending the game 
Absolute number you did 
not get 20 points* 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
0 
 
         
1          
2          
3          
4          
5          
6          
7          
8          
9          
10          
…          
*when you were in group B 
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AppendiK 4 
Proof of the Uemmata 1-4 
 
To save on notation, in this appendix, we will skip the agent`s index i.  
 
A formulation that is general enough to include all cases considered in this paper is: Some 
agent with discounted expected utility function plays a simple game in discrete time where 
after each period with probability ! the game is continued. He can be in two states, say A and 
B. If he is in A he can take the actions + or #. If he chooses # he stays in A otherwise he 
moves to B. In B nature chooses an action, say 6 or ) with probability µ. If u is chosen the 
agent stays in B otherwise he goes back to A. If the agent chooses # he receives utility 6>JG#? 
and if + is chosen he receives 6>JG+?: If nature chooses 6&he receives 6>MG6?&otherwise he 
receives 6>MG)?:  The following chart displays the situation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now, since there are no state variables other than A and B, it is clear that the best policy is 
stationary. Hence the best policy can be derived from the Bellman equations. In the following 
lemma it is determined under which conditions on the exogenous parameters [6>JG+?G6>JG#?G&
6>MG6?&6>MG)?G&!G&H ] the agent chooses which policy. It is shown that + is optimal if and only if 
# is not optimal. Hence, in computing explicit formulas for the optimal policy it is sufficient 
to concentrate on one case, say the conditions for n being optimal, as we did in the paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
 B 
$
!%"
(
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Uemma 19 
 
% $
,
Consider the Bellman equations
( ) max ( , ) ( ), ( , ) ( )
( ) (1 )[ ( , ) ( )] [ ( , ) ( )]
Then for all parameter values [ ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), , ]
such that  is a solution  is 
# +
I J 6 J # I J 6 J + I M
I M 6 M 6 I M 6 M ) I J
6 J # 6 J + 6 M 6 6 M )
+ #
& &
9 & 9 &
& 9
" ' '
" ) ' ' '
@ A
no solution and vice versa.
Proof:
Using the second Bellman equation, V(B) can be expressed by V(A):
1( ) (1 ) ( , ) [ ( , ) ( )]
1 (1 )
Thus the first Bellman equation, taking this into account, re
I M 6 M 6 6 M ) I J9 9 &
& 9
" ) ' '
) )
@ A
,
ads as:
( ) max ( , ) ( ), ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) [ ( , ) ( )]
1 (1 )
Suppose  is the optimal choice:
1Then ( ) ( ) ( , )
1
And  if and only if:
# +
=
R
I J 6 J # I J 6 J + 6 M 6 6 M ) I J
#
I J = I J 6 J #
= R
&& 9 9 &
& 9
&
, -
0 0
" ' ' ) ' '1 2) )0 0
7 8
" * "
)
B
!""#""$
!"""""""""""#"""""""""""$
@ A
2
2
1 ( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) [ ( , ) ( , )]
1 1 (1 ) 1
1 ( , ) 1 ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , )
1 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
Suppose  is the optimal choice:
Then ( ) ( ) 1
1 (1 )
6 J # 6 J + 6 M 6 6 M ) 6 J #
6 J # 6 J + 6 M 6 6 M )
+
I J R I J 6
& &9 9
& & 9 &
9& & 9 9
& & 9 & 9
9&
& 9
. /
B ' ) ' '3 4) ) ) )5 6
*
CD
) B ' ) 'EF) ) ) ) )G H
CD
" * ) "EF ) )G H
@ A
@ A
12
2
( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , )
1 (1 )
1And G >  if and only if: ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
1
11 ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1
1 ( , ) 1 (
1 1 (1 )
J + 6 M 6 6 M )
= I J 6 J # I J I J 6 J #
6 J + 6 M 6 6 M ) 6 J #
6 J # 6 J
& 9 9
& 9
&
&
9& & 9 9
& 9 & 9 &
9&
& & 9
)
' ) '
) )
B ' * B
)
*
CD . /
) ' ) ' BEF 3 4) ) ) ) )5 6G H
CD
) =EF) ) )G H
@ A, ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , )
1 (1 )
which is exactly the condition for playing  reversed.
+ 6 M 6 6 M )
#
& 9 9
& 9
' ) '
) )
 
QED. 
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To save on notation, we will further on denote  
n a* * * *
i \i n i \i ai ir ( p , p ) by r  and r ( p ,p ) by r .  
 
The Lemma 2 then reads as: 
 
Uemma 2 
 
Consider the Bellman equations 
 
$% n an,a(A) max r  + !V(A), u(-c) + r   !V(B)I " '  
 
a aV(B) (1 µ)[r  + V(B)] µ[u(g)+r ] !V(A)]&" ) ' '  
 
Then “n” is the agent`s best choice provided 
__ /
& &+ , where 
 
n a__
n a
( ) [r -r ]max 0,min 1,
( ) (1 ) ( ) [r -r ]
/ 6 3
6 2 6 3
&
9 9 9
, -. /) ) '
" 1 23 4) ) ) '5 67 8
 
 
Proof: 
 
Without loss of generality, we can subtract rn from every utilty level and denote by 
+ #/ / /I " ) . Then the choice-equivalent Bellman equations are: 
 
$%
n,a
(A) max  !V(A), u(-c) + r   !V(B)I " I '  
 
V(B) (1 µ)[ r  + V(B)] µ[u(g)+ r ] !V(A)]&" ) I ' I '  
 
Use the second Bellman equation to express V(B) via V(A): 
 
@ A( ) ( )( )
1 (1 )
/ 6 2 I J
I M
9 &
9 &
I ' '
"
) )
 
 
Now suppose, “n” is  optimal, then: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0.I J I J I J&" < "  
 
This is indeed the case if an only if:  
 
( )( ) 0.
1 (1 )
/ 6 26 3 / 9&
9 &
, -I '
) ' I ' +1 2) )7 8
   (1 (1- ) ) 09 &J ) B  
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@ A(1 (1 ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ) 0.6 3 / / 6 29 & & 9* ) ) ) ' I ' I ' +   
 
( ) [ ( ) ( )]
[ ( ) ] (1 ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] (1 ) ( )
+ #
+ #
6 3 / 6 3 / /
6 2 / 6 3 6 2 / / 6 3
&
9 9 9 9
) ) ) I ) ) ' )
* + "
' I ) ) ) ' ) ) ) )
 
 
QED. 
 
 
Uemma J9 
 
The cut-off value with indirect reciprocity 
__ /
&  is not larger than the cut-off value without 
reciprocity
__ EE
&  if # +/ /+ . 
 
 
Proof: 
 
As above, let + #/ / /I " ) . Then  
 
__ __[ ( ) ] ( )
[ ( ) ] (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
/ EE6 3 / 6 3
6 2 / 6 3 6 2 6 3
& &
9 9 9 9
) ) ' I ) )
" + "
' I ) ) ) ) ) )
 
 
@ A@ A @ A( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ] (1 ) ( )6 2 6 3 6 3 / 6 3 6 2 / 6 39 9 9 9* ) ) ) ) ' I ( ) ' I ) ) )  
 
@ A( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )6 2 6 3 / 6 3 /9 9 9* ) ) ) I ( ) I  
 
@ A( ) ( ) 0.6 2 6 3 /9* ) ) I (  
 
Recalling that ( ) 0 and ( ) 06 2 6 3B ) = , this is true if and only if a0,  i.e. r .#/ /I ( ( . 
 
 
Uemma 49 
In the Game II with indirect reciprocity we get a r #/( in every symmetric equilibrium and 
c) in a non-monetary asymmetric equilibrium this condition holds if e b+ , while 
d) in a monetary asymmetric equilibrium this condition holds if  e b( and 3
2
& + . 
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Proof: 
 
Recall the equilibrium payoffs:  
 
n
ap  = 0, p = 
1
3 2& 9
&
) '
)
 
 
Using the definition of reciprocity due to Fehr Schmidt (1999) # +/ /+  is equivalent to: 
 
* *( )    (1 )
1 1
$ 3 2 , 3 2O # #
O O
& 9 & 9 &
& &
. / . /) ) ' ) ) '3 4 3 4) + J )
) )3 4 3 4
5 6 5 6
 
 
* *( )[ ] [ ]$ ,O # 3 2 # 3 2
O O
& 9 & 9) )* ) ) ' + ) '  
[ ( *) *][ ] 0.$ O # ,# 3 2&9* ) ) ) ' (  
 
where n* is the former n*i , i.e. number of other players playing „n“.We immediately see that 
in a symmetric equilibrium, i.e. for n*=0 or n*=N, this inequality is satisfied, noting that in 
those cases we have µ=1 respectively µ=0. 
 
Furthermore recall that 
*2max 0,min 1, O #
O
9
, -. /)
" 1 23 4
5 67 8
. 
Plugging in these values gives in the inequality above yields for the two of asymmetric 
equilibria, non-monetary and monetary asymmetric equilibria: 
 
a) Suppose we are in a non-monetary asymmetric equilibrium, i.e. * / 2# O( . 
Then µ=0 and the inequality is satisfied iff * $O#
$ ,
(
'
. A sufficient condition is obtained for 
the smallest n* such that  * / 2# O( . Then , $( will do. 
 
b) Suppose we are in a monetary asymmetric equilibrium, i.e. * / 2# O= . 
 
Then 2 *O #
O
9 )"  and the inequality is satisfied if and only if  
 
2 *[ ( ) *] 0.O #$O , $ # 3 2
O
&. ) /CD) ' ) ' (F E3 4G H5 6
A sufficient condition is 
2 *[ ( ) *] 0 and 0.O #$O , $ # 3 2
O
&. ) /CD) ' ( ) ' (F E3 4G H5 6
 
 
 In the worst case n* is such that  * / 2 1# O" ) . Then and c/g, $ &+ + will do. 
 
QED. 
 
